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Abstract 
This paper addresses the hotly-debated question: do Chinese firms overinvest? A firm-level dataset of 
100,000 firms over the period of 2000-07 is employed for this purpose. We initially calculate 
measures of investment efficiency, which is typically negatively associated with overinvestment. 
Despite wide disparities across various ownership groups, industries and regions, we find that 
corporate investment in China has become increasingly efficient over time. However, based on direct 
measures of overinvestment that we subsequently calculate, we find evidence of overinvestment for 
all types of firms, even in the most efficient and most profitable private sector. We find that the free 
cash flow hypothesis provides a good explanation for China‟s overinvestment, especially for the 
private sector, while in the state sector, overinvestment is attributable to the poor screening and 
monitoring of enterprises by banks.  
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1. Introduction 
China has experienced an investment boom in recent years. Gross fixed capital formation has 
averaged 33 percent of GDP since economic reform commenced in 1978, and 39 percent over 
the last decade. A wide range of arguments is offered by way of explanation. For instance, 
Gong and Lin (2008) argue that the vast surplus of labour in rural areas, and the easy and 
cheap credit provided by the government via its state banking system, are the preconditions 
for the high investment rate. According to Aziz and Dunaway (2007), it is the attractive 
returns on investment that provide Chinese firms with strong incentives to invest. They point 
out that low bank lending rates and abundant retained earnings have kept the cost of 
investment funds low. Barnett and Brooks (2006) provide evidence that the non-state sector 
has been the driver in the recent investment surge, and that it has been funded mainly by 'self-
raised' funds emanating from the growth of company profits. Knight and Ding (2010) stress 
the high growth expectations and investment confidence that flow from China's 'development 
state'.  
Nevertheless, whether or not China overinvests is a matter of controversy. Although 
investment and investment-generated improvements in productivity are important drivers of 
China‟s rapid economic growth, the high investment rate may also be an important source of 
macroeconomic imbalances. Concern has been expressed that too much investment may 
create industrial overcapacity, generate inefficiency, and threaten profits and employment.  
This paper aims to assess the extent to which Chinese firms overinvest and to analyze 
the determinants of their overinvestment. To this end, we use a firm-level dataset of 100,112 
Chinese firms over the period 2000-2007. We first look at overinvestment indirectly, 
constructing firm-level measures of investment efficiency, and provide descriptive statistics 
so as to shed light on the linkages between investment efficiency and ownership, industry, 
time, and geographic location. A GMM estimator is used to examine the determinants of 
investment efficiency. We then proceed to measure firm-level overinvestment and free cash 
flow directly by employing approaches pioneered by Richardson (2006) and Bates (2005). 
Where overinvestment does exist, we examine whether it can be explained by the free cash 
flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) or the absence of disciplinary role of debt (Stulz, 1990). To 
the best of our knowledge, none of the existing literature has attempted to use both such a 
comprehensive dataset and systematic empirical methods to explore the overinvestment issue 
in relation to Chinese firms.   
We find that, despite significant differences across ownership groups, industries and 
regions, the general investment efficiency of Chinese firms has increased over time. Debt 
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contributes positively to the investment efficiency of private firms, but not that of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). This implies that preferential lending to the state sector by the 
banking system remains problematic. Evidence of overinvestment is found for all types of 
firms. In the state sector, overinvestment is attributable to the poor screening and monitoring 
of SOEs by banks, whereas in the private sector, it can be explained by abundant cash flow 
generated from high profits.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
relevant theories and empirical evidence on overinvestment, both in general and in the 
context of China. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 examines the investment efficiency 
of Chinese firms using both descriptive statistics and regression methods. Section 5 employs 
various methodologies to attempt to answer the question: do Chinese firms overinvest?  
Section 6 draws conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Overinvestment – general literature 
According to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), managers have incentives to 
expand their firms beyond the optimal size. The underlying reason is that growth strengthens 
managers‟ power by increasing the resources under their control: as a firm becomes larger, 
more opportunities exist for managers to indulge their desires for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary (power and prestige) benefits. Hence, there exist conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers over dividend policies. The conflict is especially severe when 
firm have „free cash flow‟, i.e. cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net present values (NPV) when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. 
Managers have to be monitored in order to prevent them from investing their free cash flow 
at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies. Jensen (1986) 
argues that, by serving this monitoring role, external capital markets in general, and debt in 
particular, could and should discipline managerial use of funds and prevent overinvestment. 
Stulz (1990) develops a theoretical model of the relationship between the source of 
financing and agency costs of managerial discretion over investment funds. Given poor 
investment opportunities, the likelihood that management invests in negative NPV projects 
increases in the level of managerial discretion over investment funds. It is shown that debt 
reduces such overinvestment by forcing managers to pay out when cash flows accrue. Thus, 
firms with poor investment opportunities benefit from higher leverage because increased 
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capital market monitoring and discipline reduce the overinvestment problem. In other words, 
debt financing pre-commits management to pay out free cash flow rather than to waste it 
when positive NPV investment opportunities are exhausted. 
Aghion et al. (1999) argue similarly that debt instruments reduce the agency costs of 
free cash flow by reducing the cash available for spending at the discretion of managers. In 
their theoretical model, this not only mitigates managerial slack but also accelerates the rate 
at which managers adopt new technologies and thus fosters growth. 
An alternative explanation for overinvestment can be found in the literature on 
financial constraints. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), information asymmetries 
increase the cost of capital for firms forced to raise external finance, therefore reducing 
investment. Yet, financial constraints are eased by the existence of abundant internally 
generated funds, which creates a tendency for overinvestment. 
Much empirical work has been conducted in this field. Using either US or Canadian 
data, Lang et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005) and Ahn et al. (2006) find a negative 
relationship between investment and leverage. The correlation is much stronger for firms 
with low growth. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Stulz (1990) that leverage inhibits 
managers of low-growth firms from investing in non-profitable capital expenditures. 
Using US data of 400 sales of subsidiaries in the 1990s, Bates (2005) relates the use 
of proceeds from asset sales to overinvestment. If retained proceeds enable firms to bypass 
external capital markets in financing any remaining positive NPV projects, a positive 
relationship should appear between post-sale capital investment and the likelihood of 
retention, and growth would be enhanced. However, if managerial discretion were to result in 
the financing of negative NPV projects, inefficiencies would be generated. In the presence of 
managerial discretion and in the absence of measures to align the incentives of managers and 
shareholders, retention decisions would bear little relation to the firm‟s growth opportunities. 
Bates (2005) finds that retaining firms systematically overinvest relative to an industry 
benchmark, and that their retention probabilities are increasing with their contemporaneous 
growth opportunities. These results suggest that there exists a trade-off between the 
efficiency benefits and managerial agency costs of retained proceeds.  
Richardson (2006) adopts an accounting-based framework to measure overinvestment 
and free cash flow. Excess investment is defined as the (positive) residuals from a regression 
of new investment on a group of explanatory variables, and free cash flow is defined as the 
amount of cash flow that is not encumbered by the need to maintain the existing assets of the 
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firm. By regressing his measure of excess investment on his measure of free cash flow, he 
finds that overinvestment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow.  
D'Mello and Miranda (2010) investigate the impact of long-term debt on the 
overinvestment decisions of firms. Employing a sample of 366 debt issues in the US over the 
period 1968-2001, they find that managers of unleveraged firms retain excessive liquidity, 
and that the issue of debt leads to a dramatic reduction in cash ratios and in abnormal capital 
expenditures. The results provide support for the hypothesis that debt reduces overinvestment.  
2.2 Overinvestment in China – macroeconomic evidence 
Several recent studies have used aggregate data to explore the question of whether China 
invests too much. They have obtained contradictory results. Zhang (2003) finds that China‟s 
ratio of fixed assets investment to GDP was not on a rising trend over the period 1978-2000, 
once the nominal investment and GDP were converted to real terms using the price index for 
capital goods and the GDP deflator respectively. His calculated incremental capital-output 
ratio shows a downward pattern, suggesting an improvement of investment efficiency at the 
aggregate level. He argues that this may have been due to rural industrialization and the 
proliferation of small firms, which could have improved allocative efficiency.  
Bai et al. (2006) derive estimates of the real rate of return on capital in the economy 
as a whole over the reform period. They find that the return to capital in China has been 
remarkably high despite the high investment rate. Possible explanations are suggested in 
terms of rapid growth in total factor productivity (TFP) and a trend towards more capital-
intensive industries. The authors also show that there were considerable differences in the 
return on capital across provinces, the return being highest in the east and lowest in the west 
of China, but that the provincial dispersion fell over time, suggesting that the misallocation of 
investment decreased over time. 
In contrast, Rawski (2002) holds a negative view of China's investment performance, 
suggesting that there were low investment returns and widespread excess capacity across 
many industries throughout the 1990s. There is in fact direct evidence of underutilization of 
capital in certain industries, particularly heavy industries dominated by the state (European 
Chamber, 2009). For instance, in 2005 the percentage rate of excess capacity was reported to 
be 34, 46, 73, 84, and 88 percent
1
 respectively in the steel, aluminium, calcium carbide, 
ferroalloy, and container industries.  
                                                          
1
 These numbers were taken from the National Development and Reform Commission, Guofa No. 38 (2009). 
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Barnett and Brooks (2006) claim that the increase in investment over the period 1990-
2005 led to a rise in the capital-output ratio and a fall in the marginal product of capital. They 
infer that the efficiency of capital declined, suggesting overinvestment. They also point out 
that it is the rising profits in both the state and non-state sectors that funded the investment 
boom since the late 1990s.  
Qin and Song (2009) attempt to measure the extent of overinvestment in China using 
provincial data for the period 1989-2004. By estimating a production function, they are able 
to predict the profit-maximizing level of investment. Defining overinvestment as actual 
minus profit-maximizing investment, they find that there was widespread overinvestment. 
Moreover, the coastal provinces, being more reformed and more prosperous, were technically 
more efficient but allocatively less efficient, i.e., they tended to show a greater degree of 
overinvestment.  
Gong and Lin (2008) point to the investment boom of the early 1990s, ignited by 
Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour in the Spring of 1992. They claim that the immediate impact 
of the investment boom was to accelerate inflation, but when the government conducted an 
anti-inflationary policy via deflationary demand management, overinvestment became 
apparent. The authors postulate that investment fluctuations of this sort can account for the 
business cycle in China.  
In brief, studies based on aggregate time-series data do not reach a consensus 
regarding the presence of overinvestment in the Chinese economy: microeconomic evidence 
is needed. 
2.3 Overinvestment in China – microeconomic evidence 
At the microeconomic level, there is some consensus on the profitability of Chinese firms but 
heterogeneous evidence on their investment efficiency. For instance, Liang (2006) claims that 
the reported investment-to-GDP ratio in China is significantly overstated owing to an 
overestimation of investment spending and an underestimation of consumption and GDP. His 
firm-level data show that the return on investment has been high and rising since the late 
1990s, as a result of the declining share of investment undertaken by SOEs. He claims that 
the so-called overinvestment problem merely reflects data quality issues and that China‟s 
investment remains profitable and sustainable.  
Making the assumption that in equilibrium the rate of return required by managers is 
equal to the cost of capital, Liu and Siu (2006) derive a measure of investment efficiency 
from a dynamic model of value optimization by firms. They find that the implied cost of 
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capital is much lower in the state than in the non-state sector. Owing to soft budget 
constraints, managers of SOEs perceive a cost of capital that is inefficiently low, and 
therefore tend to overinvest from society's perspective. They estimate that the welfare loss 
resulting from the misallocation of capital amounts to 8% of GDP.    
Dollar and Wei (2007) examine the efficiency of capital allocation in China using a 
sample of over 12,000 firms in 120 cities for the years 2002-04. They find that state 
ownership is systematically associated with easier access to formal finance and also lower 
returns to capital. After more than two decades of economic reforms, the bias in favour of 
SOEs remains intact. In contrast, non-state firms with higher returns to capital are held back 
by financial constraints. The authors conclude that the immature financial system has 
imposed costs on the economy in the form of investment misallocation towards inefficient 
SOEs equal to about 5% of GDP, 
Lu et al. (2008) use profitability as a measure of investment efficiency of China‟s 
industrial firms. Their various indicators show a falling trend in the profit rate from 1978 to 
the mid-1990s, and a subsequent rise from 1998 onwards. This pattern holds for both SOEs 
and private firms, but there exists a sharp contrast in the sectoral composition of their 
respective profit sources. The most profitable SOEs concentrate in several highly 
monopolized sectors including electricity production and supply, petroleum and gas 
extraction, and tobacco production. Hence, the rising profitability of SOEs might in part 
reflect the outcome of government regulatory policies. In contrast, the most profitable 
industries for private firms are highly competitive ones such as textiles, machinery, and food.  
Firth et al. (2008) test the relationship between leverage and investment in 1,200 
Chinese listed firms over the period 1991-2004. They find that there is a negative link 
between the two variables, and that the relation is weaker in firms with low growth 
opportunities, poor operating performance, and high degree of state shareholding. They 
conclude that the state-owned banks in China impose few restrictions on the capital 
expenditures of slowly growing and poorly performing firms, as well as firms with greater 
state ownership, with consequent bias towards overinvestment. 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use firm-level data to examine the impact of resource 
misallocation on aggregate manufacturing productivity in China (and India) in comparison 
with the US. They find evidence of greater distortions in resource allocation in China than in 
the US. They show that if capital and labour were hypothetically reallocated to equalize 
marginal products to the extent observed in the US, manufacturing TFP would rise by 30-50% 
in China (and by even more in India). 
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Chen et al. (2010) examine the connection between government intervention and 
investment efficiency using a panel of listed firms in China from 2001 to 2006. Instead of 
directly measuring firms‟ investment efficiency, they argue that the smaller sensitivity of 
investment expenditure to investment opportunities for SOEs compared to non-SOEs is 
evidence for lower investment efficiency in the state sector. They conclude that government 
intervention through majority state ownership or the appointment of politically connected 
managers distorts SOEs‟ investment behaviour and harms investment efficiency, particularly 
in those SOEs controlled by local governments. 
Although the studies surveyed above present intuitively appealing results, the datasets 
used in most of these studies cover either a fairly small number of firms or a relatively short 
time period, making the representativeness of the findings questionable. Moreover, each 
single method of measuring investment efficiency, or overinvestment, inevitably involves 
strong assumptions. We contribute to this literature by using a more comprehensive dataset 
and by adopting several methodologies to measure investment efficiency and overinvestment, 
with the objective of finding a robust answer to our question of whether or not Chinese firms 
overinvest. 
3. Data and sample 
Firm-level data offer several advantages for the study of investment behaviour: the problem 
of aggregation over firms is eliminated in estimation, and heterogeneity among various types 
of firms can be taken into account (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). This is particularly 
important for China owing to the institutional differences between state and non-state 
enterprises. 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) over the period of 2000-2007. This dataset includes 
all SOEs and other types of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about 
$650,000) or more. These firms operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and in 31 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. We deleted observations with negative 
values of: sales; total assets minus total fixed assets; total assets minus liquid assets; and 
accumulated depreciation minus current depreciation. Firms that did not have complete 
records of our main regression variables were also dropped. To control for the potential 
influence of outliers, we excluded observations in the one percent tails of each regression 
variable. Finally, we removed all firms with less than five years of consecutive observations.  
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Our final dataset covers 100,112 (mainly unlisted) firms, which corresponds to 
639,382 firm-year observations
2
. Our sample is unbalanced, and its structure  can be observed 
in Table A1 in the Appendix. The number of observations ranges from a minimum of 49,639 
in 2000 to a maximum of 93,330 in 2003. There was entry and exit of firms during our 
sample period: less than 30 percent of firms have the full 8-year accounting information. The 
active entry and exit of firms is the consequence of enterprise restructuring, which began in 
earnest in the mid-1990s. It can be viewed as a source of dynamism in this sector (see, for 
instance, Brandt et al., 2009).  
The NBS data contain a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on the 
fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by six different types of investors, namely the state; 
foreign investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); investors from 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective investors. The 
rationale for dividing foreign investors into those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and 
those from other parts of the world is that the former capture the so-called „round-tripping‟ 
foreign direct investment, whereby domestic firms may register as foreign invested firms 
from nearby regions to take advantage of the benefits (such as tax and legal benefits) granted 
to foreign invested firms (Huang, 2003). Ownership by legal entities is a mixture of 
ownership by state and private legal entities: it represents a form of corporate ownership
3
. 
Finally, collective firms are typically owned collectively by communities in urban or rural 
areas (they are known as „township and village enterprises‟ or TVEs). 
We group all foreign firms (from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other parts of the 
world) into a single category (which are labelled foreign); and all firms owned by legal 
entities and individuals into a single category (labelled private)
4
. Thus our firms fall into four 
broad categories - state-owned, collective, private, and foreign - based on the shares of paid-
in-capital contributed by the four types of investors each year.  
                                                          
2
 The NBS dataset does not allow separate identification of publicly listed companies in China. Specifically, it is 
difficult to track these companies as their legal identification numbers were changed when they went public (Liu 
and Xiao, 2004). Over the period considered, there were slightly more than 1000 listed companies operating in 
the manufacturing and mining sectors - amounting to less than 0.3% of the total number of firms in our sample. 
3
 Legal entities represent a mix of various domestic institutions, such as industrial enterprises, construction and 
real estate development companies, transportation and power companies, security companies, trust and 
investment companies, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research institutions etc. 
4
 Within this category, firms owned by individuals represent about two thirds of the total. As firms owned by 
legal entities include firms owned by state legal entities, one could question their inclusion in the private 
category. One reason for including them is that while the state‟s primary interest is political (i.e. aimed at 
maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries), legal entities are profit-oriented 
(Wei et al., 2005). Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and non-state legal entities, 
we are unable to exclude the former from our private category. However, all our results are robust to excluding 
all firms owned by legal entities from the private category.   
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We adopt two methods to classify firms by ownership. First, we group firms 
according to the majority average ownership shares. For instance, if the average share of 
capital paid-in by private investors over the period 2000-2007 is greater than 50%, then the 
firm is classified as privately owned. One potential problem with this method is that the size 
of the private ownership group is likely to be exaggerated. According to Haggard and Huang 
(2008), defining China‟s private sector is difficult, as genuinely private domestic firms are 
different from government-controlled firms. They argue that the former group has remained 
relatively small and subject to many controls and permissions, for instance with regard to the 
provision of finance and the requirement of official approval of investment projects above a 
certain size. To take account of this phenomenon, our second approach to classification is 
based on a 100% rule. For instance, a firm is classified as privately-owned when all the paid-
in-capital in each year is contributed by private investors. This method allows us to focus on 
the de jure private firms which are more likely to represent the true private sector. The cost of 
the second approach is that a significant number of firms are left in a residual category. This 
is referred to as the mixed ownership group, in which firms do not have a dominant investor 
(by the majority rule) or a single-type investor (by the 100% rule).  
Table A2 in the Appendix presents the distribution of observations by ownership 
using both methods. Our sample is dominated by private firms: 62% of firms are classified as 
privately-owned by the majority rule and 38% by the 100% rule. SOEs, collective firms and 
foreign firms represent 8%, 8% and 18% of our sample respectively, based on the majority 
rule, and 4%, 3% and 10% respectively using the 100% rule. The second approach leads to a 
decrease of the number of firms in all four types of ownership groups, and an increase of 
firms in the mixed ownership group (46% of our observations are classified as mixed 
ownership firms). Since the composition of investors in this residual group is unclear, the 
second method involves a significant loss of observations despite its clearer identification of 
private ownership. We therefore rely on the majority classification rule. 
Table A2 also shows an interesting pattern of the evolution of ownership over the 
eight-year period. Taking the majority classification rule as an example, we find that the 
proportion of SOEs in our sample declined dramatically, from 12% in 2000 to 5% in 2007. A 
similar pattern holds for collective firms, whose share declines from 11% to 7%. In contrast, 
the share of private firms climbed from 52% to 66%. The share of foreign firms remained 
roughly stable at between 17 and 19%.  Privatization of small SOEs and TVEs became 
significant after 1998 (Haggard and Huang, 2008). Our dataset reflects the restructuring 
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process involved in the shrinkage of the state and collective sectors and the expansion of the 
private sector.      
4. Investment efficiency of China 
4.1 Methodology 
We first adopt the method proposed by Dollar and Wei (2007) to measure the investment 
efficiency of Chinese firms. Investment efficiency can be seen as an indirect measure of 
overinvestment: firms that overinvest are likely to exhibit low levels of investment efficiency. 
In Dollar and Wei‟s (2007) simple model, the profit-maximizing firm   faces the following 
problem: 
                                                                            ,                                          (1) 
where    is the firm‟s profit,    is the output price,    is  output,    is the rental cost of capital, 
   is capital usage,    is the wage rate, and    is the firm‟s labour usage. The firm subscript i 
reflects the fact that distortions in the output and factor markets can be firm-specific and 
make the firm‟s effective output price and input costs deviate from the market prices. The 
production function is assumed to take the form:        
   
   , where    is firm-specific 
TFP, and  , the capital share in output, is assumed to be the same for all firms in each 
industry.  
The first-order condition for profit maximization is that the marginal revenue product 
of capital (    ) should equal the firm-specific interest rate,            
            . 
Since not all distortions faced by the firm are observable,     is difficult to calculate. By 
virtue of the Cobb-Douglas production function,      is proportional to an observable 
variable, the average revenue product of capital (    ),       
    
  
 
 
 
      . In our 
panel data context, we define      as the ratio of value added to capital, i.e.: 
                                                                     
     
    
  ,                                                          (2) 
where       is the real value added of firm   in period  , which is equal to the sum of pre-tax 
profit income and labour compensation, deflated by the provincial ex-factory producer price 
index; and      is real tangible fixed assets, deflated using a fixed capital formation deflator.   
Instead of inferring      from the estimated     , an alternative method is to 
compute it from the rate of profit on capital:  
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  ,                                                (3) 
where          is the total wage bill of firm   at time  . Despite the very strong and contestable 
assumptions involved in such approximation
5
, this alternative approach has the advantage of 
not relying on the Cobb-Douglas production function specification, based on the capital share 
being the same across firms. Since      and     , as measures of firm efficiency, 
inevitably involve respective sets of assumptions, we make use of both proxies in order to 
combine the strength of both and to circumvent the limitations of each. 
We first compare      and      across various categories of firms using simple 
summary statistics. Then formal regression analysis is adopted to examine not only the 
disparity of investment efficiency but also its determinants. We initially estimate the 
following equation: 
                                                                                  
                                                                             ,                    (4) 
where       is the investment efficiency of firm   at time  , measured in turn as      and 
                    is the ratio of cash flow over total tangible fixed assets of firm   at 
time    , where cash flow is defined as the sum of the firm's net income and 
depreciation.                   is firm   s rate of growth of real sales;               is the 
ratio of total debt divided by total assets. Firm         is the natural logarithm of firm age; and 
               is the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm‟s real total assets. 
                     include three dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm is owned 
respectively by the state, collective, or foreign agents, and 0 otherwise. The private 
ownership group is set as the benchmark group. A deflator for capital stock is used to deflate 
tangible fixed assets, and the provincial ex-factory producer price indices taken from various 
issues of China Statistical Yearbook are used to convert other variables from nominal to real 
terms. 
The error term in equation (4) comprises five components.    is a firm-specific time-
invariant component, encompassing all time-invariant firm characteristics likely to influence 
investment efficiency, as well as the time-invariant component of the measurement error 
affecting any of the regression variables.    is a time-specific component accounting for 
                                                          
5
 In aggregate models of perfect competition, in which a single good is produced and that good is used both in 
consumption and as a capital good, the marginal revenue product of capital equals its rate of return. This method 
is also based on the assumption that wage payment can be accurately observed. 
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possible business cycles;    is an industry-specific component reflecting industrial features 
associated with investment efficiency;    is a region-specific component which captures 
geographic factors that influence investment; and      is an idiosyncratic component. We 
control for    by estimating our equations in first-differences, and for    ,   , and    by 
including year, industry and regional dummies in all our specifications.      
We are particularly interested in the role of debt in limiting any overinvestment bias 
caused by the managerial agency problem, i.e. we wish to test the hypothesis that high 
leverage discourages management from undertaking non-profitable investments. In the case 
of China, it is interesting to examine the differential impact of debt on the investment 
efficiency of different ownership groups. We therefore interact the leverage term with the 
ownership dummies in our model specification, as follows:  
                                                                                   
                                                                                    
                                                          ,                                                   (5) 
where     ,     ,       and      are dummy variables equal to 1 if firm i is classified as 
state-owned, collectively-owned, privately-owned and foreign-owned respectively, and 0 
otherwise.  
The system GMM estimator is used to estimate equations (4) and (5) in order to take 
into account unobserved firm heterogeneity and possible endogeneity and mismeasurement 
problems of the regressors. It combines the standard set of equations in first-differences with 
an additional set of equations in levels. By adding the original equation in levels to the 
system and exploiting these additional moment conditions, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) found a dramatic improvement in efficiency and a significant 
reduction in finite sample bias compared with first-differenced GMM. Our initial instrument 
choice in the first-differenced equations consists in all regressors (except firm age) lagged 
twice or more, while the instruments in the level equations are first-differences of all 
regressors (except firm age) lagged once. 
In assessing whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is employed to evaluate the 
overall validity of the set of instruments. In addition, we assess the presence of n
th
-order 
serial correlation in the differenced residuals using the m(n) test, which is asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal under the null of no n
th
-order serial correlation of the 
differenced residuals. In the presence of serial correlation of order n in the differenced 
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residuals, the instrument set needs to be restricted to lags n+1 and further. Since all our 
models generally fail the test for second-order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals, 
levels of all endogenous variables lagged three times or more are used as instruments in the 
first-differenced equations, and first-differenced variables lagged twice are used as additional 
instruments in the levels equations. By restricting the number of instruments used in each 
first-differenced equation, we alleviate the potential instrument proliferation problem 
(Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2009). 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the investment rate and investment efficiency 
proxies. Both means and medians are provided, as the latter are not influenced by outliers. 
We focus our discussion on means. When firms are classified by ownership (Panel A), we 
find that net fixed investment as a proportion of tangible fixed assets (   ) is lowest for 
SOEs (4.1%). Private firms have the highest investment rate (10.6%), followed by foreign 
firms (9.9%). SOEs have the lowest investment efficiency as measured by both      
(52.7%) and      (19.2%). Foreign firms have the highest      (110.8%), collective 
firms the highest     (54.1%), and private firms the second highest values of both. This 
initial evidence conflicts with the conventional view that SOEs are the main source of 
overinvestment: although they are the least efficient sector in their use of capital, they have 
accumulated capital less rapidly than other ownership groups. 
In Panel B, we group firms into ten industries, i.e. metal and metal product; non-
mental products and petroleum processing; chemicals and plastic products; machinery and 
equipment; electrical equipment; transport equipment; food and tobacco; textile; leather, 
timber and furniture; and mining and logging. Electronic equipment and transport equipment 
have the highest values for both the investment rate and the two investment efficiency 
measures. In contrast, food and tobacco, non-metal products, and petroleum processing have 
the lowest ratios for all three variables. Interestingly, the labour-intensive textile industry has 
a very high     , perhaps reflecting the efficiency improvement associated with rapid 
expansion of textile exports and the profitability of exports. In summary, our results suggest 
that the industries that invest more are also those that are more efficient, and there is no 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that overinvestment occurs particularly in heavy 
industries. 
Both      and     follow a strictly rising trend over the period 2000-07 (Panel 
C), suggesting a consistent improvement of firm-level investment efficiency. The investment 
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rate was lowest in 2004 (5.2%), perhaps reflecting the tight monetary and fiscal policies 
implemented between August 2003 and October 2004  to reduce overheating in the economy. 
The co-existence of the highest investment rate (15.1%) and the lowest investment efficiency 
(as measured by both      and  ) in 2000 suggests the presence of overinvestment at the 
start of the period. Over time, investment efficiency gradually increased, implying that any 
overinvestment that existed initially had diminished by the end of the period. 
Panel D shows that the coastal provinces have the highest investment rate (10.2%), 
the highest      (106%), and the highest     (48.3%), while the western provinces have 
the lowest ratios for all three variables. Capital accumulation was more rapid in the regions 
with more productive and more profitable capital. 
Our initial descriptive statistics are not suggestive of much overinvestment. Firms 
with high investment rates (i.e., private and foreign firms, operating in electronic and 
transport equipment industries, located in the coastal region) are also those with high average 
and marginal revenue product of capital. The year 2000, with its high investment and low 
efficiency, might be the exception, but our proxies for investment efficiency increased 
consistently thereafter. It should be noted that the examination of firm efficiency without 
standardizing for firm-specific factors such as firm size, firm age, and growth opportunities 
may be misleading. We therefore next analyze the determinants of investment efficiency, 
making use of a regression analysis. 
4.3 Regression analysis 
i. Basic model of investment efficiency 
The estimates of our basic model (equation 4) are reported in Table 2. In the      
regression (column 1), we find that the cash flow ratio has a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting a positive relationship between investment efficiency and the 
abundance of internal funds. Cash flow, however, may be an imperfect proxy for changes in 
net worth, as it might contain information about expected future profitability or more in 
general, demand factors, which would be relevant to investment decisions even under the null 
hypothesis of perfect capital markets (Bond et al., 2003; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008). To 
ensure that this does not happen, we include in the regression a distinct measure of 
investment opportunities. Since most firms in our sample are not listed in the stock market, 
we follow Konings et al. (2003) and Guariglia (2008) and use the annual growth rate of real 
sales to this end. Our results show that firms with higher investment opportunities tend to 
invest more efficiently.  
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The coefficient associated with the leverage term is significantly positive: a one 
percentage point rise in the debt to assets ratio raises the average revenue product of capital 
by 0.2 percentage points. This supports the arguments by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) that 
debt reduces managerial discretion to invest in negative NPV projects, and thus improves 
firms‟ investment efficiency. In addition, we find that investment efficiency measured by 
     is higher for firms that are relatively old and small.  
After accounting for firms‟ internal and external finance, investment opportunities, 
firm size, firm age and other factors,      is found to be statistically and substantially lower 
for SOEs than for domestic private firms. The difference is as much as 11.8 percentage points. 
The coefficient for collective firms is insignificant. Foreign firms have a higher      than 
private firms, and thus have the highest ratio among all ownership groups. These results are 
in line with our initial descriptive statistics. 
In the case of     (column 2), we obtain similar results for the cash flow and sales 
growth variables. Yet, the leverage term is insignificant in determining MRPK. This might 
reflect the offsetting effects of debt among various ownership groups. Firm age and firm size 
also have poorly determined coefficients. Interestingly, the coefficient on the SOE dummy 
remains negative and highly significant, indicating a lower     than in the case of private 
firms. In line with the descriptive statistics, collective firms have the highest     , and 
     is slightly lower for foreign than for private firms.  
The validity of the instrument sets is confirmed by the m3 test. The p values of the 
Hansen J test is significant, which may result from the large size of our panel. The Monte 
Carlo evidence of Blundell et al. (2000) show that, when using system GMM on a large panel 
data to estimate a production function, the Sargan test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity. Consistent with this, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) report significant 
Sargan test statistics for all of their estimation results on UK firms, and Benito (2005), and 
Benito and Hernando (2007) for several of theirs. We are therefore inclined to pay little 
attention to the J test, as long as the test for third order autocorrelation of the differenced 
residuals is satisfactory. 
In summary, our basic model shows that SOEs have much lower investment 
efficiency - in terms of both      and    - than private firms. Having sufficient internal 
funds and more investment opportunities contributes positively to both measures of 
investment efficiency. The role of debt in alleviating overinvestment bias and in promoting 
investment efficiency is found for      but not    . 
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ii. The effects of leverage on investment efficiency for different ownerships 
Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (5). Our focus is on the interactions between 
leverage and the four ownership dummies. In the case of      (column 1), leverage reduces 
the investment efficiency of SOEs: a one percentage point rise in the debt to assets ratio in a 
state-owned firm reduces its average revenue product of capital by 0.5 percentage points. 
Furthermore, debt contributes positively and significantly to the investment efficiency of 
private firms and foreign firms, with bigger effects for the latter. Similar results hold for the  
     regression (column 2), except for the insignificant coefficient of the leverage term for 
foreign firms. The findings that leverage has a significantly negative effect on investment 
efficiency in SOEs but a significantly positive effect in private firms remain robust.  
Table 3 also reports p-values associated with    tests aimed at assessing whether the 
impact of leverage on investment efficiency is equal across various ownerships. The 
hypothesis is rejected when SOEs are compared with private and foreign firms. 
The differences in the impact of debt on investment efficiency among various 
ownership groups can be attributed to China‟s inefficient financial system. China has a 
„repressed‟ financial system, and the degree of government intervention in bank lending 
decisions has been remarkably high (Riedel et al., 2007). Despite the 15-year reform of the 
banking sector, bank loans constitute a major share of investment financing only for SOEs, 
whereas private firms are generally discriminated against by the formal financial system and 
have to rely predominantly on internal funds to finance their investment (Allen at al., 2005; 
Guariglia et al., 2011). There is evidence that these problems have become less severe since 
2000 (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008). Although the state-owned banks have become more 
profit-oriented over the decade, Haggard and Huang (2008) argue that private investment has 
remained financially constrained. 
Our results provide further evidence that Chinese banks are generous in their lending 
to SOEs, but do not carry out effective monitoring. As a consequence, investment efficiency 
in the state sector is lower the higher the leverage. In contrast, because banks have incentives 
to impose disciplinary pressures on private and foreign firms, debt plays a significant role in 
enhancing their investment efficiency.  
In summary, our regression analysis shows that there exist significant differences in 
investment efficiency among the four ownership groups after controlling for several firm-, 
industry-, time- and region-specific factors. SOEs are found to invest much less efficiently 
than their non-state counterparts, especially private and foreign firms. We also find evidence 
that bank lending to state firms creates a bias towards low investment efficiency and, hence, 
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overinvestment in these firms. The disciplinary role of debt in alleviating the overinvestment 
bias (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) is found only in the private sector, which is both the driver of 
the investment boom and the engine of the rapid economic growth in China (Ding and Knight, 
2008; 2010).     
5. Does China overinvest? 
5.1 Methodology  
By measuring and explaining the investment efficiency of firms, Section 4 only provided 
indirect evidence of overinvestment. In this section, we attempt to provide a more direct 
answer to the question: do Chinese firms overinvest? This also enables us to test directly for 
the free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment and to assess whether debt plays a 
disciplinary role in alleviating managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Two 
approaches are adopted, each involving strong and different assumptions. Given that neither 
overinvestment nor free cash flow is directly observable, our use of two methods is intended 
to provide a more robust answer to our research question. 
We first adopt the approach introduced by Richardson (2006), which uses an 
accounting-based framework to measure both overinvestment and free cash flow. According 
to Richardson (2006), overinvestment is defined as investment expenditure beyond that 
required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investment in positive NPV 
projects. The following identity holds: 
                                                                              ,                                         (6) 
where total investment expenditure of firm   at time   (         ) is decomposed into the 
required investment expenditure to maintain assets in place (                ) and new 
investment expenditure (       ). The new investment expenditure can in turn be decomposed 
into the expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects (        
 ) and 
overinvestment in negative NPV projects (       
 
) as follows: 
                                                                 
         
 
  ,                                                  (7) 
where the expected component (       
 ) varies with firm‟s growth opportunities, financing 
constraints, industry affiliation and other factors; and the unexpected or abnormal component 
(        
 
) can be either positive or negative, corresponding to overinvestment or 
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underinvestment respectively. The difficulty is one of implementation, i.e. how to measure 
the expected and unexpected components of new investment. 
Following Richardson (2006), we define                 as amortization and 
depreciation, which proxies the portion of total investment expenditure that is necessary to 
maintain plant, equipment, and other operating assets.        
  is the predicted value from the 
following model: 
                                                                         
                                                                                ,  (8) 
where        , the net fixed investment divided by the real tangible fixed assets, corresponds 
to the new investment expenditure (       ). A lagged dependent variable is included to 
reflect the sluggish adjustment that may characterize corporate investment in response to 
changes in the explanatory variables. The other variables are the same as those included in 
equation (4). Because we cannot compute Tobin‟s Q, which is typically included in 
investment models to control for investment opportunities, as most firms in our sample are 
not listed, the growth of real sales is used to capture investment opportunities. This is an 
imperfect measure of demand and it may generate measurement error. However, this method 
has been widely used in the investment literature (Konings et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008). The 
positive values of the residuals (       
 
) from the model established in equation (8) are then 
used as our estimate of overinvestment (          ).  
According to Richardson (2006), free cash flow is the cash flow beyond what is 
required to maintain assets and finance expected new investments. It can be defined as 
follows: 
                                                                                 
   ,                       (9) 
where       is free cash flow, and is equal to the cash flow/asset ratio (           ) net of 
amortization and depreciation (               ) and expected new investment (       
 ). 
The residual approach to calculating overinvestment and the use of a reduced form 
investment model are open to measurement error problems. We therefore utilize an 
alternative approach, developed by Bates (2005) to calculate an alternative set of 
overinvestment (            ) and free cash flow (       ) measures. Bates (2005) 
determines whether firms overinvest or not, by comparing the cash and capital expenditure 
ratios of sample firms in a given year to those of median industry firms in that year. If the 
difference between net capital investment of a sample firm and that of the median firm in the 
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same industry is positive, then the firm overinvests. If the difference is negative, then the firm 
underinvests. The positive values of this difference are labelled OVERINV2. Free cash flow 
(FCF2) is then defined as the cash flow of a sample firm that exceeds the median cash flow 
of all firms operating in the same industry. We follow this definition to construct our second 
set of measures. 
To test for the free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment, we first estimate the 
following basic regression: 
                                                                      , (10) 
where               and             are our overinvestment and free cash flow measures 
constructed using Richardson‟s (2006) and Bates‟ (2005) approaches in turn. We further 
distinguish the effects of free cash flow on the overinvestment of firms owned by different 
agents, by estimating the following equation:  
                                                                           
                                                                       ,                                         (11) 
where                 ,                 ,                    and             
     are the interactions between our free cash flow measures and various ownership 
dummies.  
It is also interesting to examine the extent to which the free cash flow hypothesis 
holds among firms with different political connections. On the one hand, government 
intervention may distort firms‟ investment behaviour, reduce investment efficiency, and lead 
to overinvestment. In particular, firms with high political affiliation are more likely to engage 
in investment that does not aim to maximize firm value, but aims to achieve objectives 
preferred by the government. Using a sample of state-owned listed firms, Chen et al. (2010) 
find evidence for this argument. On the other hand, political connections could be 
economically beneficial for firms by providing access to key resources such as bank loans 
and other preferential government policies like tax benefits (Li et al., 2008). Given these two 
offsetting effects, we keep an open view on the coefficients of those variables involving 
different levels of political affiliation in the following overinvestment equation: 
                                                                
                                     ,                            (12) 
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where         ,          and       are dummy variables equal to 1 if firms i has high, 
medium, and no political affiliation respectively, and 0 otherwise
6
. 
Lastly, the following two models are estimated to examine the role of debt in 
alleviating the overinvestment bias for firms owned by different agents (equation 13) and 
firms with different degrees of political affiliation (equation 14):  
                                                                          
                                    4         ,  1      + 5         ,  1     +  +  +  +  +  , , (13) 
                                                                         
                                                                                   .              (14) 
 
These equations are estimated using the system GMM estimator discussed in Section 4.1. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
To compute Richardson‟s (2006) measures, we estimate equation (8) and use it to predict net 
fixed investment for each firm. The results are reported in Table 4: the model performs  well, 
and the results are consistent with common findings in the investment literature. For example, 
the lagged dependent variable is significant, implying that that the dynamic model fits the 
data and correctly captures the smooth adjustment of investment. Both the cash flow term and 
the growth of real sales attract positive and significant coefficients, suggesting the importance 
of internal funds and investment opportunities in determining firm investment. The 
coefficient on leverage is negative and highly significant. This finding is consistent with that 
of Firth et al. (2008), and can be seen as evidence in favour of a disciplinary role of debt on 
firms‟ investment decisions. Younger firms and larger firms tend to invest more. Both SOEs 
and foreign firms invest less than private firms, which is in line with our initial descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 1. 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for        ,        
  and        
 
 for the four 
ownership groups. The pattern of expected new investment (        
  ) is very similar to that 
of actual new investment (       ): it is highest for private firms, followed by foreign firm 
and collective firms, and lowest for SOEs.         
  is always slightly lower than          (by 
                                                          
6
 Our dataset contains a measure of firms‟ political affiliation, which takes values from 10 to 90. High political 
affiliation (i.e. affiliation with central or provincial governments) corresponds to a value below 20; medium 
political affiliation (i.e. affiliation with local governments) corresponds to a value between 20 and 90; and no 
political affiliation corresponds to a value of 90. 6.4% of the firms in our sample have high political affiliation, 
39.82% have medium affiliation, and 53.78% have no affiliation. This distribution is fully documented in Table 
A3 in the Appendix.  
22 
 
1.5%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.0% for state, collective, private and foreign firms respectively). This 
gives a relatively small residual term (        
 
 ). Hence, by comparing the mean values of 
these variables, we do not find much evidence of overinvestment, as the discrepancy between 
actual and optimal levels of investment is small. However, the aggregation of a large number 
of firms might conceal the fact that some firms overinvest and others underinvest, so that the 
small average values simply result from the two opposing effects.  
We next define our first measure of overinvestment (       ) as the positive 
values of        
 
. We also calculate the percentage of firms that overinvest (        ), 
which is a binary variable taking a value of one if the firm overinvests (i.e. if        
 
  ), 
and zero otherwise. We then construct free cash flow (   ) using equation (9). Following 
Bates‟ (2005) definition, we construct a comparable set of measures of overinvestment 
(        ), percentage of firms that overinvest (         ), and free cash flow 
(    ). The descriptive statistics of the two sets of variables together with the leverage ratio 
are presented for each ownership group in Table 6. 
Overinvestment (        ) characterises 22.1% of all firm-year observations in 
our sample. Although the percentage is slightly lower for private (20.2%) and collective firms 
(20.9%), and slightly higher for SOEs (25.5%) and foreign firms (28.2%), overinvestment is 
quite common in all types of firms. Once underinvesting firms are removed, overinvestment 
calculated following Richardson‟s (2006) definition and expressed as a proportion of tangible 
fixed assets (       ) is given by 24.8% for the full sample. It is highest for private firms 
(26.5%) and lowest for SOEs (19.1%). The ratio of free cash flow to tangible fixed assets 
(   ) is 14.6% for the full sample; it is lowest for SOEs (3.2%) and highest for collective 
firms (21.9%). 
 Bates‟ (2005) definitions yield very similar results to Richardson‟s (2006) for both 
overinvestment (        ) and free cash flow (    ). Yet, there is a discrepancy in the 
proportion of firms that overinvest (         ): Bate‟s (2005) ratios are much higher 
than those based on Richardson‟s (2006) definition: 44.6% of firm-year observations show 
overinvestment, with private firms exhibiting the highest figure (46.3%) and SOEs, the 
lowest (35.0%).   
Descriptive statistics for the leverage ratio are also presented in Table 6. The ratio is 
57.8% for the full sample. It is highest for SOEs (63.1%) and lowest for foreign firms 
(48.5%). This evidence of lax lending to SOEs echoes the findings in Section 4.  
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5.3 Regression analysis 
i. The free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment 
According to Jensen (1986), managers of firms with funds in excess of those required to 
finance positive NPV projects are likely to overinvest. We test this hypothesis using equation 
(10). The results are reported in Table 7. Based on Richardson‟s (2006) definitions (column 
1), the free cash flow term is found to be positive and significant in the overinvestment 
equation: a one percentage point rise in the free cash flow ratio raises a firm‟s overinvestment 
ratio by 0.08 percentage points. This positive relationship constitutes evidence in favour of 
the free cash flow hypothesis. Compared with the benchmark group of private firms, all other 
ownership groups (SOEs, collective firms, and foreign firms) tend to exhibit lower 
overinvestment: the coefficients on the ownership dummies are in fact all negative and 
precisely determined. The results using Bates‟ (2005) definitions confirm our finding of 
support for the free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment (column 2).  
In contrast with conventional thinking, it is the private sector rather than the state 
sector that has overinvested most in recent years. One possible explanation is that the rising 
profitability in the non-state sectors generates abundant free cash flow, which leads to 
excessive investment. In contrast, SOEs do not have much free cash flow at hand because 
they are less profitable, and this restricts their proclivity for overinvestment. Another 
possibility is that SOEs have divested to get rid of obsolete capital in the face of increasing 
competition, and that this restructuring has curbed their tendency to overinvest (Ding et al., 
2010).   
Table 8 reports the estimates of equations (11) and (12), which are aimed at testing 
the effects of free cash flow on overinvestment for firms owned by different agents and firms 
with different degrees of political affiliation. In panel A, we can see that based on the 
definitions of both Richardson (2006) and Bates (2005), the coefficient of free cash flow is 
positive and significant for all types of ownership groups. Yet, there is no clear pattern in the 
magnitude of the free cash flow coefficient across ownership groups. A similar story holds 
for political connections: free cash flow has a significantly positive effect on the 
overinvestment of firms with high, medium and no political affiliations, and the magnitude of 
the interacted coefficients is quite similar (Panel B). Hence, the sensitivity of overinvestment 
to free cash flow, although always positive, appears to be very similar across firms owned by 
different agents and firms characterized by different levels of political affiliation.   
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ii. The disciplinary role of debt in limiting overinvestment 
Both Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) emphasize the role of debt as an efficient governance 
instrument to mitigate the agency costs associated with overinvestment. They argue that high 
leverage can discourage management from undertaking non-profitable investments: debt pre-
commits firms to pay cash as interest and principal and such commitments can reduce 
managerial discretion over free cash flow that may otherwise be allocated to negative NPV 
projects. 
Table 9 shows estimates of equations (13) and (14), which aim at testing this 
hypothesis. In column 1 of panel A, which is based on Richardson's (2006) definitions,  after 
introducing the interaction terms of leverage and ownership dummies, the coefficient of the 
free cash flow term remains significantly positive, which suggests that our support for the 
free cash flow hypothesis is robust. Leverage is found to reduce overinvestment for private 
firms only: a one percentage point rise in the debt to assets ratio reduces private firms‟ 
overinvestment by 0.09 percentage points. No significant debt effects are found for SOEs, 
collective and foreign firms. Hence, the disciplinary pressures from banks help to curb any 
tendency to overinvestment in the private sector. In contrast, SOEs, which have enjoyed 
relatively easy access to formal finance (reflected by their high leverage ratio), are unlikely to 
face strict screening and monitoring pressures from banks.  
The results based on Bates‟ (2005) measures support the free cash flow hypothesis of 
overinvestment, but not the disciplinary role of debt in limiting overinvestment: none of the 
interaction terms is significant (column 2).  
Lastly, we compare the effects of debt on overinvestment among firms with different 
degrees of political affiliation. The free cash flow hypothesis is supported again using the 
definitions of both Richardson (2006) and Bates (2005). Interesting results are found in terms 
of the effects of debt. Focusing on Richardson's definitions (2006), leverage has a significant 
and positive impact on overinvestment in firms with high political affiliation, but a 
significantly negative effect in firms with medium or no political affiliation (column 1). 
When firms have high political affiliation, banks‟ incentives to exert disciplinary pressures on 
them may be compromised. Without sound monitoring, external funds may lead to more 
overinvestment in firms with high political affiliation. In contrast, the disciplinary role of 
debt is found for firms with medium or no political affiliation. Interestingly, the biggest effect 
of debt in reducing overinvestment is found for firms with medium political affiliation rather 
than for those without political affiliation. This confirms our hypothesis that, in China, a 
certain degree of political connections may be beneficial for firms in order to gain access to 
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external finance and other opportunities, but too much government intervention may distort 
incentives and harm investment efficiency. 
Using Bates' (2005) definitions (column 2), a similar story is found for firms with 
high political affiliation:  a one percentage point rise in the leverage ratio raises the 
overinvestment ratio by 0.10 percentage points. Yet, the coefficients of debt for firms with 
medium and no political affiliations are negative but not statistically significant. 
6. Conclusion 
We have adopted various methodological approaches to examine investment efficiency and 
the overinvestment behaviour of a large sample of Chinese firms over the period 2000-2007. 
We first looked at overinvestment indirectly, by calculating the average and marginal revenue 
product of capital as measures of investment efficiency. The initial descriptive statistics 
suggested that firms that invest most (such as private and foreign firms, operating in the 
electronic and transport equipment sectors, and located in the coastal region) also have the 
highest investment efficiency. Furthermore, investment efficiency was found to rise 
consistently over time. Regressions testing the determinants of investment efficiency 
indicated that internal funds and investment opportunities contribute positively to investment 
efficiency. Leverage was found to improve the investment efficiency of private firms but to 
reduce that of SOEs. This might be attributed to soft budget constraints in the state sector, 
which limit the disciplinary role of debt. The differences in investment efficiency among 
state-owned, private, and collective enterprises were found to be important. 
In order to provide some direct evidence of overinvestment, we adopted two methods 
(one attributable to Richardson, 2006, and the other to Bates, 2005) to construct measures of 
overinvestment and free cash flow. Looking at the mean values of the sample as a whole, the 
phenomenon of overinvestment did not appear to be important, as we found little discrepancy 
between actual and optimal investment. However, focusing on different groups of firms, we 
found significant disparities among firms, with some overinvesting and others underinvesting.  
When we examined only the overinvesting firms, we found a ratio of overinvestment to 
tangible fixed asset of about 25% in the full sample, which was highest for private firms and 
lowest for SOEs. Depending on the methodology used, we found that between 22% and 45% 
of the firms in our sample overinvest.   
Our regression analyses strongly supported the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen 
(1986) according to which firms are likely to overinvest when cash flow exceeds its optimal 
level. This offers an explanation for the overinvestment of private firms. Their rising 
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profitability in recent years has generated significant free cash flow that has induced 
overinvestment. The disciplinary role of debt on overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) 
was found to hold for private firms, but not for SOEs. This helps to explain overinvestment in 
the state sector: despite the gradual financial sector reforms, banks still impose fewer 
restrictions on SOEs‟ borrowing and investment decisions, which creates an overinvestment 
bias. As for political affiliation, we found that debt can limit the overinvestment bias only for 
firms with medium or no political affiliations.  
This research informs the current debate about the policy challenges stemming from 
China‟s remarkably high investment. China‟s urban-oriented, highly capital-intensive 
industrial development strategy, starting from the 1990s, and the corresponding high 
investment rate generated massive macroeconomic imbalance. The share of profits in national 
income rose markedly, so that the share of wage income kept falling. This contributed to 
rising income inequality and constrained household expenditure. Our research helps to 
provide some concrete policy suggestions towards the goal highlighted in the recent Chinese 
Communist Party (CPC)'s Central Committee Meeting (the Fifth Plenum of the 17
th
 CPC), i.e. 
to shift China‟s growth pattern from investment-driven towards consumption-driven during 
the period 2011-15. For instance, tax policies should be introduced to reduce the excess cash 
flow of firms, especially some monopolistic firms with extraordinary profits. Further 
financial reforms are needed to strengthen the role of banks or other creditors in corporate 
governance, and to enhance the role of stock markets in improving market discipline. 
Institutional reforms are also necessary to reduce the degree of political intervention in firms‟ 
investment decisions and in banks‟ lending decisions.    
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of investment efficiency measures 
 
Panel A. By ownership 
 
 
SOEs 
Collective 
firms 
Private firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Fixed investment/tangible fixed 
assets (I/K) 
0.041 
(0.021) 
0.072 
(0.056) 
0.106 
(0.087) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
Average revenue product of 
capital (ARPK) 
0.527 
(0.296) 
1.092 
(0.666) 
0.981 
(0.606) 
1.108 
(0.636) 
Marginal revenue product of 
capital (MRPK) 
0.192 
(0.104) 
0.541 
(0.294) 
0.468 
(0.279) 
0.451 
(0.257) 
Observations 48,689 52,427 399,079 113,469 
 
Note: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. The ownership 
classification is based on the majority rule. 
 
Panel B. By industry 
 
 
Metal & 
metal 
product 
Non-metal 
product & 
petroleum 
processing 
Chemical & 
plastic 
Machinery & 
equipment 
Electronic 
equipment 
Fixed investment/tangible fixed 
assets (I/K) 
0.105 
(0.085) 
0.071 
(0.047) 
0.097 
(0.076) 
0.103 
(0.084) 
0.115 
(0.093) 
Average revenue product of 
capital (ARPK) 
0.957 
(0.611) 
0.781 
(0.447) 
0.828 
(0.530) 
0.994 
(0.658) 
1.205 
(0.727) 
Marginal revenue product of 
capital (MRPK) 
0.466 
(0.278) 
0.384 
(0.215) 
0.452 
(0.269) 
0.493 
(0.289) 
0.526 
(0.305) 
Observations 56,013 58,283 107,052 75,434 82,945 
 
Transport 
equipment 
Food & 
tobacco 
Textile 
Leather, 
timber & 
furniture 
Mining & 
logging 
Fixed investment/tangible fixed 
assets (I/K) 
0.115 
(0.095) 
0.075 
(0.046) 
0.092 
(0.068) 
0.089 
(0.059) 
0.081 
(0.058) 
Average revenue product of 
capital (ARPK) 
0.923 
(0.585) 
0.630 
(0.380) 
1.275 
(0.727) 
0.923 
(0.529) 
0.834 
(0.475) 
Marginal revenue product of 
capital (MRPK) 
0.434 
(0.256) 
0.351 
(0.200) 
0.431 
(0.254) 
0.397 
(0.235) 
0.467 
(0.236) 
Observations 31,428 24,758 95,480 59,913 47,920 
 
Note: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. 
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Panel C. By year 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Fixed investment/tangible fixed 
assets (I/K) 
0.151 
(0.122) 
0.093 
(0.066) 
0.107 
(0.079) 
0.101 
(0.069) 
0.052 
(0.039) 
0.113 
(0.086) 
0.101 
(0.081) 
0.083 
(0.058) 
Average revenue product of 
capital (ARPK) 
0.772 
(0.463) 
0.853 
(0.492) 
0.893 
(0.530) 
0.930 
(0.559) 
0.967 
(0.591) 
1.012 
(0.621) 
1.078 
(0.661) 
1.200 
(0.732) 
Marginal revenue product of 
capital (MRPK) 
0.360 
(0.209) 
0.378 
(0.216) 
0.406 
(0.236) 
0.431 
(0.249) 
0.438 
(0.255) 
0.471 
(0.278) 
0.502 
(0.296) 
0.559 
(0.328) 
Observations 49,639 66,241 78,640 93,330 92,291 91,147 87,147 80,947 
 
Note: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. 
 
Panel D. By region 
 
 Coastal 
region 
Inner 
region 
Western 
region 
Fixed investment/tangible fixed 
assets (I/K) 
0.101 
(0.079) 
0.083 
(0.061) 
0.073 
(0.045) 
Average revenue product of 
capital (ARPK) 
1.062 
(0.647) 
0.762 
(0.441) 
0.657 
(0.390) 
Marginal revenue product of 
capital (MRPK) 
0.483 
(0.286) 
0.384 
(0.195) 
0.303 
(0.173) 
Observations 481,756 87,736 69,890 
 
Note: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. The coastal region  
includes Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong,  
and Hainan, plus Beijing (11 provinces). The inner region includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang,  
Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan (9 provinces). The Western region includes Chongqing,  
Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan (11 provinces). 
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Table 2. Basic model of investment efficiency 
 
 ARPK 
(1) 
 MRPK 
(2) 
                 1.153** (0.044)  0.896** (0.023) 
                    0.153** (0.046)  0.043*  (0.023) 
                0.199** (0.072)  -0.036   (0.036) 
              0.121** (0.011)   0.004   (0.004) 
                -0.169** (0.014)   0.006   (0.006) 
              -0.118** (0.028)  -0.090** (0.005) 
                      0.012   (0.024)   0.016** (0.005) 
                   0.199** (0.018)  -0.059** (0.006) 
    
m3 test (p value)  0.986  0.331 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.000  0.000 
Observations 286,548  286,548 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the average revenue product of capital (ARPK) and the marginal revenue product 
of capital (MRPK) respectively in columns 1 and 2. All specifications were estimated using a sustem GMM estimator. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. We treat 
              ,                 ,              and                as potentially endogenous variables: levels of 
these variables lagged 3 times or more are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-differences 
of these same variables lagged twice are used as additional instrument in the level equations.  m3 is a test for third-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. Time dummies, industry dummies, and regional dummies are included in both the regressions 
and the instrument set. The ownership classification is based on the majority rule. ** and * indicate significance at 
the 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Table 3. The role of debt in investment efficiency 
 
 ARPK 
(1) 
 MRPK 
(2) 
                 1.284** (0.093)   0.985** (0.021) 
                   -0.021   (0.138)   0.130** (0.051) 
              0.133** (0.032)   0.016*  (0.009) 
                -0.167** (0.021)   0.014*  (0.007) 
                    -0.513** (0.227)  -0.184** (0.072) 
                     0.602   (0.453)   -0.016   (0.167) 
                      0.302** (0.115)    0.091*  (0.049) 
                     1.078** (0.286)    0.053   (0.058) 
    
H0:impact of               on ARPK or MRPK 
is the same across SOEs and collective firms (p 
value) 
0.016 
 
0.395 
H0:impact of               on ARPK or MRPK 
is the same across SOEs and private firms (p 
value) 
0.000 
 
0.000 
H0:impact of               on ARPK or MRPK 
is the same across SOEs and foreign firms (p 
value) 
0.000 
 
0.000 
m3 test (p value)  0.930  0.360 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.961  0.005 
Observations 286,548  286,548 
 
Note: SOEi, PRIVi, COLi, and FORi are dummy variables equal to 1 if firm i is owned respectively by the state, 
private, collective, and foreign agents, and 0 otherwise. We treat 
              ,                  ,               ,                   ,                   ,               
     , and                    as potentially endogenous variables: levels of these variables lagged three times or 
more are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-differences of these same variables lagged 
twice are used as additional instrument in the level equations. The p values associated with Chi-square tests for 
general restrictions are reported. Also see Notes to Table 2.  
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Table 4. Investment equation 
 
Dependent variable:        
           0.361** (0.042) 
                 0.029*  (0.016) 
                    0.203** (0.021) 
               -0.074** (0.032) 
             -0.010** (0.003) 
                 0.021** (0.006) 
      -0.023** (0.004) 
      -0.001   (0.003) 
      -0.027** (0.005) 
  
m3 test (p value)  0.169 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.000 
Observations 286,379 
 
Note: We treat               ,                 ,              and                as 
potentially endogenous variables: levels of these variables lagged three times or more 
are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-differenced of these 
same variables lagged twice are used as additional instrument in the level equations. 
Also see Notes to Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for        ,        
  and         
 
 
 
 
SOEs 
Collective 
firms 
Private firms 
Foreign 
firms 
         
0.041 
(0.021) 
0.071 
(0.087) 
0.107 
(0.087) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
       
   
0.026 
(0.027) 
0.061 
(0.062) 
0.098 
(0.098) 
0.089 
(0.088) 
       
 
  
0.015 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(-0.002) 
0.010 
(-0.005) 
Observations 45,695 47,852 349,994 103,072 
 
Note: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. The ownership 
classification is based on the majority rule. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of overinvestment and free cash flow measures 
 
 
Full sample SOEs 
Collective 
firms 
Private firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Richardson (2006)’s definitions 
         
0.248 
(0.160) 
0.191 
(0.111) 
0.244 
(0.147) 
0.265 
(0.178) 
0.230 
(0.146) 
          
0.221 
(0.000) 
0.255 
(0.000) 
0.209 
(0.000) 
0.202 
(0.000) 
0.282 
(0.000) 
     
0.146 
(0.024) 
0.032 
(-0.005) 
0.218 
(0.059) 
0.142 
(0.022) 
0.169 
(0.035) 
Bates (2005)’s definitions 
          
0.257 
(0.191) 
0.214 
(0.144) 
0.249 
(0.181) 
0.269 
(0.206) 
0.237 
(0.169) 
           
0.446 
(0.000) 
0.350 
(0.000) 
0.426 
(0.000) 
0.463 
(0.000) 
0.443 
(0.000) 
      
0.153 
(0.000) 
-0.043 
(-0.102) 
0.224 
(0.031) 
0.155 
(0.005) 
0.192 
(0.028) 
leverage ratio 
          0.578 
(0.592) 
0.631 
(0.643) 
0.591 
(0.605) 
0.597 
(0.614) 
0.485 
(0.481) 
Observations 639,382 48,689 52,427 399,079 113,469 
 
Note: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. 
       ,         , and     are Richardson‟s (2006) measures of the amount of 
overinvestment, the percentage of firms that overinvest, and free cash flow, respectively; 
        ,          , and      are Bates‟ (2005) definitions of the same variables. 
OVERINV and OVERINV2 are calculated on the samples of firms that actually overinvest. The 
ownership classification is based on the majority rule. 
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Table 7. The free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment (basic equation) 
 
 Richardson’s (2006) 
definitions 
(1) 
 Bates’ (2005) 
definitions 
(2) 
               0.075** (0.038)   0.059** (0.005) 
      -0.058** (0.004)  -0.049** (0.002) 
      -0.019** (0.004)  -0.028** (0.001) 
      -0.030** (0.002)  -0.035** (0.001) 
    
m3 test (p value)  0.170  0.763 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.271  0.000 
Observations 107,128  254,142 
 
Note: The dependent variables are             or             respectively in columns 1 and 2. FCF is used as 
independent variable in column 1, and FCF2, in column 2. We treat         and           as potentially endogenous 
variables: levels of these variables lagged three times or more used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, 
and first-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as additional instrument in the level equations. Also 
see Notes to Tables 2, 3, and 6. 
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Table 8. The free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment (robustness tests) 
 
Panel A. Effects on firms owned by different agents 
 
 Richardson’s (2006) 
definitions 
(1) 
 Bates’ (2005) 
definitions 
(2) 
               i 0.048** (0.017)  0.069** (0.016) 
                  0.098** (0.018)  0.051** (0.007) 
                   0.068** (0.007)  0.068** (0.003) 
                  0.021** (0.007)  0.032** (0.004) 
    
m3 test (p value)  0.139  0.752 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.001  0.163 
Observations 107,128  254,142 
 
 
Panel B. Effects on firms with degrees of political affiliation 
 
 Richardson(2006)’s 
definitions 
(1) 
 Bates(2005)’s 
definitions 
(2) 
                  i 0.034** (0.015)  0.047** (0.008) 
                    i 0.059** (0.007)  0.054** (0.003) 
                   0.055** (0.006)  0.064** (0.002) 
    
m3 test (p value)  0.150  0.728 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.001  0.018 
Observations 107,128  254,149 
 
Note: The dependent variables are             and             respectively in columns 1 and 2. FCF (interacted 
with relevant dummy variables) is used as independent variable in column 1, and FCF2 (interacted with relevant 
dummies), in column 2. We treat all regressors as potentially endogenous variables: levels of these variables lagged 
three times or more are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-differenced of these same 
variables lagged twice are used as additional instrument in the level equations. Also see notes to Tables 2, 3, and 6. 
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Table 9. The role of debt in alleviating the overinvestment bias 
 
Panel A. Effects on firms owned by different agents 
 
 Richardson’s (2006) 
definitions 
(1) 
 Bates’ (2005) 
definitions 
(2) 
               0.071** (0.026)   0.066** (0.017) 
                 i  -0.032   (0.049)  -2.080   (1.491) 
                     0.022   (0.111)    1.305   (1.657) 
                     -0.089** (0.042)   0.551   (0.492) 
                 i -0.090   (0.068)   1.299   (1.134) 
    
m3 test (p value)  0.177  0.160 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.015  0.379 
Observations 107,128  254,142 
 
 
Panel B. Effects on firms with different degrees of political affiliation 
 
 Richardson’s (2006) 
definitions 
(1) 
 Bates’ (2005) 
definitions 
(2) 
               0.094** (0.026)   0.062** (0.010) 
                    i  0.176** (0.094)   0.097** (0.058) 
                      i -0.084** (0.050)  -0.002   (0.029) 
                  i -0.046** (0.039)  -0.009   (0.024) 
    
m3 test (p value)  0.175  0.809 
Hansen J test (p value) 0.199  0.010 
Observations 107,128  254,149 
 
Note: The dependent variables are             and             respectively in columns 1 and 2. FCF (together 
with variables involving leverage) is used as independent variable in column 1, and FCF2, in column 2. We treat all 
regressors as potentially endogenous variables: levels of these variables lagged three times or more are used as 
instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as 
additional instrument in the level equations. Also see Notes to Tables 2, 3, and 6.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Structure of our unbalanced panel 
Panel I. 
 
Year Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
2000 49,639 7.76 7.76 
2001 66,241 10.36 18.12 
2002 78,640 12.30 30.42 
2003 93,330 14.60 45.02 
2004 92,291 14.43 59.45 
2005 91,147 14.26 73.71 
2006 87,147 13.63 87.34 
2007 80,947 12.66 100.00 
Total 639,382 100.00  
 
Panel II.  
 
Number of obs. per 
firm 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
5 154,645 24.19 24.19 
6 140,316 21.95 46.13 
7 153,685 24.04 70.17 
8 190,736 29.83 100.00 
Total 639,382 100.00  
 
Table A2. Distribution of observations by ownership  
Panel I. By the majority rule 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign 
firms 
Mixed 
ownership 
Total 
2000 11.80 11.06 52.04 19.49 5.61 100.00 
2001 9.49 9.62 58.00 18.20 4.69 100.00 
2002 8.65 8.90 60.89 17.23 4.33 100.00 
2003 7.57 8.04 63.36 17.25 3.77 100.00 
2004 7.36 7.83 63.56 17.53 3.71 100.00 
2005 6.75 7.62 64.42 17.47 3.73 100.00 
2006 6.27 7.21 65.18 17.69 3.65 100.00 
2007 5.28 6.93 66.25 17.99   3.55 100.00 
Average 7.62 8.20 62.42 17.75 4.02 100.00 
 
Note: all numbers are in percentage terms.    
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Panel II. By the 100% rule 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign 
firms 
Mixed 
ownership 
Total 
2000 5.89 3.58 23.53 10.54 56.45 100.00 
2001 4.75 3.13 31.18 10.04 50.90 100.00 
2002 4.27 2.96 35.43 9.62 47.73 100.00 
2003 3.71 2.71 39.57 9.96 44.05 100.00 
2004 3.68 2.69 40.00 10.21 43.41 100.00 
2005 3.25 2.57 40.52 10.21 43.45 100.00 
2006 2.95 2.40 41.14 10.39 43.13 100.00 
2007 2.23 2.27 42.04 10.62 42.85 100.00 
Average 3.69 2.73 37.67 10.18 45.72 100.00 
 
Note: all numbers are in percentage terms.    
 
 
Table A3. Distribution of firms by degree of political affiliation 
Political affiliation level Original 
values 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
High political affiliation 
10 12,270 1.92 1.92 
20 28,674 4.48 6.40 
Medium political affiliation 
40 53,838 8.42 14.82 
50 73,605 11.51 26.34 
61 11,535 1.80 28.14 
62 48,363 7.56 35.70 
63 29,964 4.69 40.39 
71 2,087 0.33 40.72 
72 35,183 5.50 46.22 
No political affiliation 90 343,863 53.78 100.00 
Total  639,382 100.00 100.00 
 
